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The provision of information on quality attributes has long been 
recognized as important to the efficient pricing and marketing of agri­
cultural products. (See, for example, Farris, Mehren, Zusman.) Product 
quality information is expected to contribute to pricing efficiency by 
making it possible for market prices to more fully reflect quality 
differences. It is important to be able to determine the success with 
which quality information schemes, like that for grain grades and standards, 
promote the prevalence of more accurate price-quality relationships in the 
market. Not only are there an increasing number of such schemes (e.g. 
those concerned with nutritional information), but also these schemes are 
costly to establish and maintain. Quality pricing accuracy would not be 
improved by establishing a quality information scheme if the quality 
information provided is irrelevant to market decision-makers.
In the United States, the economic suitability of the quality infor­
mation upon which the 65-year-old system of grain grading is based is at 
issue, and is emphasized by the major role of grains in United States 
foreign trade. To maintain a competitive position in world grain markets, 
grain shipments to major importers must continue to be of a quality 
sufficient to assure acceptability. The information provided within the 
grain grades and standards should help pull the required quality of grain 
through the marketing channel by making it possible for the proper price- 
quality signals to be transmitted to handlers and producers.
*The authors are grateful to Lowell Hill and Lee Schrader, who provided 
very helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper.
-2-
In United States’ grain markets, price-quality relationships are 
expressed in terms of price discounts on standardized quality factors 
(e.g. percent moisture, bushel testweight in pounds, percent damage and 
percent foreign matter). Buyers monetize their perception of the value 
of a decrement in quality by setting an offer price below the price they 
are willing to pay for the standard quality (in most cases, "No, 2") bushel 
of grain. Final offer prices are based upon "discount schedules" set by 
buyers for each of the government-mandated quality factors. For example, 
a bushel of wheat might be discounted below the No. 2 price on the basis 
of a schedule that calls for a 12 cent reduction for the first 1/2 percent 
moisture above standard quality (e.g. 13.5 percent H^O) and 3 cents for 
each 1/2 percent moisture increment thereafter.
The question is whether the standardized quality factors sufficiently 
encompass those raw material characteristics that significantly affect 
grain buyers’ handling costs and end product values. If the standardized 
grain quality factors do not include input characteristics of economic 
value to end users of grain and/or include some quality characteristics of 
no economic importance to buyers and processors, then the market price 
signals based upon those inappropriate grain quality factors will be 
inefficient and lead to suboptimal resource allocation. In practice this 
kind of pricing inefficiency can occur when quality characteristics of 
economic importance are not discounted, or when the quality factors that 
are subject to discounting do not reflect the raw material characteristics 
that are economically relevant to grain buyers. A methodology to assess 
this latter type of pricing inefficiency is developed here and applied to 
the New York and Pennsylvania markets for wheat and corn. Only after
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detennining if the current quality factors already subject to discount 
are economically relevant should work on developing additional quality 
factors to discount be attempted.
In this paper, a model is formulated which expresses the prices of 
quality characteristics as a function of economic elements, such as grain 
end-use value, that are considered important in the efficient pricing 
(discounting) of quality characteristics. By determining the extent to 
which the buyer discount schedules reflect or are explained by these 
economic elements, the economic relevance of the existing standardized 
quality factors can be assessed.
An empirical model, suitable for statistically testing hypotheses 
regarding the relationship between the prices of quality characteristics 
and input quality is constructed from the theoretical model. In subsequent 
sections, data sources and variable selection for the empirical model are 
discussed, hypothesized net relationships among variables are presented 
and appropriate features of the statistical testing procedure, canonical 
correlation, are outlined. Finally the results of the statistical analysis 
are interpreted in terms of the economic relevance of the existing grain 
quality standards and their contribution to market pricing efficiency.
Theoretical Model of Quality Discounts
A simple single product— single raw material (input) model is developed 
to illustrate how the amount of an input characteristic (e.g. moisture, 
bushel testweight) influences a buyer's valuation of the input. Output is 
a function of the amount of input characteristics provided to the produc-
, thtion process. If q = output quantity and X_. = the total quantity of the j
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characteristic of the input used in production, then the general production 
function can be written as q = F(X^, X , X^) or simply q = F(X_.).
That is, output of the end product is a function of the quantities of input 
quality characteristics supplied to the production process. Further, let 
R = the value to the input purchaser of a unit of input characteristic j .
j
The profit function can be written as:
m
(1) TT = pF(X. ) - . 1 -  R . X . ,J 1=1 1 1
where the latter term is equivalent to the price per unit of input times 
the quantity of input used.
In grain marketing, equation (1) is the profit function for a buyer
of standard "No. 2" quality grain. Buyers recognize that the addition
of units of characteristic j away from the No. 2 level results in reduced
revenue and extra handling expenses (e.g. drying costs) If X^ | = the number
2of units of characteristic j that is acceptable as No. 2 quality and X^ =
the number of units of characteristic j that are not within the No. 2 range,
1 2then the production function can be rewritten as q = F(X_,, X ). Total 
1 2  1revenue, pF(X^, X^ ,) is less than pF(X_.). To compensate for the revenue
reduction (due to loss of end product output or quality) caused by each
additional unit of characteristic j away from the No. 2 level, a buyer
ttlwill discount the j characteristic by an amount equal to r_.. Also the 
buyer will be compensated, via the discount schedule, for handling costs 
incurred for each additional unit away from the No. 2 level by an amount 
equal to h_..
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Let D. = r + h.. D. is the change in buyer valuation of the j J J J J
characteristic, or the total compensation the buyer receives for units
til, *of the j characteristic away from No. 2 quality. The profit function
can be rewritten as:
(2) 77 m£
j-1
R.X1 J J
U l  ry t i t  r t
Z D.XT + S h.xf] 
j~l J J j=l J ^
Say a buyer discounts only for excess moisture and high foreign matter.
If he dries the grain to No. 2 levels, removing the excess moisture so
that it does not affect the end production process, but does nothing to
2remove foreign matter, which does cause a reduction in output, a r_.X^.
term in the profit function will appear relating to foreign matter, but
not to moisture. On the other hand, the excess moisture removal does
2result in drying costs, (+h_.X.), to the buyer which must be compensated
2for with the moisture discount (-h.X.).J J
Since the total quantity of each characteristic used is equivalent
to the amount, in bushels, of the grain input used (V) times the amount 
thof the j characteristic provided by each unit of input (X ), equation
(2) can be rewritten as:
(3) 7T = 1 9  m~ P F(Xj ’ ~ t £ R.X1 Vj=l 3 jv
m
. _ Dj Xjv V + 2 h.x: V]J=1 J JV j=1 J  jv
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To find the effect of a change in the per bushel number of units of 
ththe j characteristic outside the No. 2 range on a profit maximizing
buyer's valuation of the grain input, the first order conditions for
2.;equation (3) are solved by differentiating with respect to X^v and setting 
equal to zero.
C4) 9tt
9Xjv
9X
P H v p )  (— ) +D.V - h V
3X‘j 3X7 3 3jv
O'* ( j  1 » ............j m)
since
9F
29X7 
J v
,F 3X?(---1_)
3X7 3X73 jv
Solving for D_. yields
«-*§-> <4 ->9X. 9X7
(5) Di = ^  + h
V J
2 2 3x2Since X. = VX. and — -  V, equation
J JV 9X7jv
can be simplified to:
(6) D - ^p(— ~ — ) + h , with 
3 9X2 j
j
9F <; 0
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In words, equation (6) represents the change in the buyer’s valuation
th •of the j characteristic, or the total compensation the buyer receives
for units of the j characteristic that deviate from No. 2 quality (i.e,
the discount). It is a function of the price of the end product times the
t h *marginal contribution of that j characteristic to production plus the 
handling cost incurred per unit of the jt 1^ characteristic away from the 
No. 2 quality. In terms of a moisture discount schedule, the change in 
buyer’s valuation, attributed to an additional unit of moisture above the 
No. 2 range (D.. In equation(6)), is expressed, for example, as a 2q deduction 
from the No. 2 price for each of these additional units of moisture. These 
deductions then, for excess moisture content, excess foreign matter, excess 
damaged kernels and deficient bushel testweight, form the data base for the 
empirical model which follows.
Empirical Model
According to equation(6), observed variation in discount schedules 
across firms (both within and across different end-product industries) 
can be explained by across-firm variation in: 1) end-product prices;
2) handling costs; and 3) marginal products of input quality characteristics. 
In a perfectly competitive market, if the quality factors upon which the 
discounts are based are economically relevant for profit maximizing by 
grain purchasing firms, then across-firm variation in their set of discount 
schedules for percent moisture, bushel testweight, percent foreign matter 
and percent damaged kernels should be explained by variation in the price 
(market value) of the grain's end-product (EUV), the marginal physical 
contribution of the quality characteristic to end-product output (MPC) and 
firm operating costs incurred as a result of sub-standard grain quality (OC).
In the case of a non-perfectly competitive market, market power on 
the buying side would be expected to provide buyers with the ability to 
raise discount schedules beyond the perfectly competitive level. A 
variable representing local market share (MS) then, was added to further 
explain across-firm variation in discount schedules.
Data Sources
New York and Pennsylvania grain buyers were surveyed regarding their 
1979 discount schedules for corn and wheat, designated end-products of 
their production operations, the size of the facilities and their annual 
share of total grain purchased in their respective local markets. The 
survey provided 50 discount schedules from 41 firms, 33 for soft wheat 
(red and white) and 17 for corn. These firms included flour millers, 
feed manufacturers, wet corn millers, and cereal manufacturers. Simple 
statistics for the full sample, reported in Table 1 demonstrate the 
extent of across-firm (within and across different end-product industries) 
variation in discount schedules.
Data entries for each discounted factor are cumulative discounts.
In other words, if corn is discounted 10 cents per bushel for the first
1/2 percent of moisture above 15 1/2 percent (upper limit for No. 2
standard quality) and 2 cents per bushel for each 1/2 percent thereafter
through, say to 18 1/2 percent, a data entry of 20 cents would appear
for the discounting firm. Since the charge by the discounting firm is
tilfor the total amount of the j characteristic (away from No. 2 standards)
2present per bushel of grain (X^ in the theoretical model) this cumulative 
approach best represents actual market pricing. This total change is 
equivalent to summing D in equation (6) for each j .
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Tablel: Summary Statistics for Data Set consisting of Wheat and
Corn Discounts. '
Discounted Attribute Mean
Cumulative Discount 
in cents/bushel
Standard Deviation of 
Cumulative Discounts
For Corn and Wheat:
Moisture* 32.84 22.30
Testweight 5.59 5.83
Foreign Matter 2.38 1.70
Damage 1.18 1.31
For Corn Only:
Moisture 21.14 16.81
Testweight 2.61 3.14
Foreign Matter 0.59 0.87
Damage 0.86 1.16
For Wheat Only:
Moisture 38.87 22.58
Testweight 7.12 6.32
Foreign Matter 3.29 1.21
Damage 1.34 1.37
Moisture discount data incorporate shrinkage adjustments.
Eight different end-product industries were observed— four for each 
grain. They included various types of flours, feeds, cereals and corn 
syrups and sugars. Average third quarter prices received for those 
end-products in 1979 were used to represent grain buyer end-use values 
(EUV). Relative firm cost structures with respect to handling grain of 
sub-standard quality (the OC variable) were obtained by matching survey 
data on operation size (annual quantity of grain handled) with published 
handling cost per bushel data for appropriate grain industries (Hill,
Hill and Stice, National Commission on Food Marketing). Local market 
share— 80 percent of respondents limited purchases to within a 20 to 30 
mile radius of their plant— serves as a proxy for non-competitive impacts 
of unequal buyer market power that may account for divergence between 
actual discounting practices and behavior predicted by the theoretical 
model. Finally, a dummy variable is used to represent MPC, the marginal 
contribution of each input quality factor to end-product output. Because 
the marginal physical product of grain quality characteristics for firms 
within the same end-product industry should be relatively similar, all pastry 
flour millers for example, are given the same dummy variable data entries.
On the other hand, because of expected differences in the marginal 
contribution of input characteristics between firms with different end- 
products, breakfast cereal producers, for example, are given different 
dummy variable entries than flour millers.
An appropriate multivariate technique for determining the degree to 
which the above set of explanatory variables accounts for the variation 
in discounts across firms is canonical correlation. (See Schrader and 
Zdanky's use of canonical correlation in testing for discount variation
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across Midwestern corn buyers.) Unlike multiple regression, which regresses
a single "dependent" variable on a set of explanatory variables, canonical
correlation allows for analysis of the associated variation in two sets
of variables. In the present study, buyer discount schedules for percent
moisture, bushel testweight, percent damaged kernels and percent foreign
matter comprise a "set" of "dependent" variables because these quality
factors are not independent of one another (e.g. moisture and testweight)
and because the factors have been designated as a set by government
1grades and standards to represent grain quality.
Canonical Correlations
The canonical correlation procedure forms weighted sums or linear
combinations of the sets of dependent ("criterion") y variables and
explanatory ("predictor") x variables such that the two linear combinations
(called "canonical variates or variables") are maximally correlated. In
other words, if Y and X are two new variables created by forming linear
m
combinations of the original two sets of variables (i.e. Y = 1 a y :  k i=l i i
X ), then the canonical correlation routine will find two unique
vectors of standardized weights, a. and that give a maximum simple ^ J
correlation coefficient (P ) for the new variables Y and X. In thecc
present study, the y variables are the discounts for the quality factors, 
i.e., moisture, testweight, foreign matter and damage, and the x variables 
are EUV, MPC, OC and MS.
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More than one pair of canonical variates can be derived. Subsequent 
pairs of variates are found that maximally correlate Y and X subject to 
being statistically independent (orthogonal) to the preceding, more 
highly correlated pairs of linear combinations. The Wilks' Lambda F 
ratio is used to establish the statistical significance of the canonical 
correlations (CCs) by testing the null hypothesis that there is no linear 
relationship between a pair of canonical variates. (See Anderson, Chapter 
9 for a detailed explanation of the use of this F ratio.)
Results and Interpretations
Output of the canonical correlation procedure for the data set con­
sisting of discount schedules for both corn and wheat is reported in 
Table 2.
2Although the squared multiple correlation coefficient (R ) indicates,
in a multiple regression context, the percentage of variation in the
dependent variable "explained" by the fitted linear combination of inde-
2pendent variables, the canonical correlation coefficient squared (P )
represents the variance shared by linear composites of two sets of
variables and not the shared variance of the two sets themselves. A
2relatively high P^c, does not necessarily indicate a strong "explanatory" 
relationship between the original sets of variables.
An alternative index of explained variation, proposed by Stewart and 
Love, called a "redundancy index," (RED) is widely accepted. The redundancy 
index gives the amount of variation in the set of "y" variables accounted 
for ("explained") by the set of "x" variables and is equivalent to the 
mean of the squared multiple correlation coefficients obtained from
Table 2: Canonical Correlations (CC) for Data Set Consisting of Discount
Schedules for Both Corn and Wheat.
CC1 CC2
p .828 .733
C C
p2 .686 .537
CC
F Statistic 7.27 4.56
Sample Size 50 50
Structure Matrices and Coefficients (S)- (Correlations between Original
Variables and Their Canonical 
Variates)
Dependent Variable Set:
Moisture .474 •450 
Testweight .446 -.088 
Foreign Matter .907 -.403 
Damage .225 • 952
Explanatory Variable Set:
End Use Value (EUV) .375 .659 
Market Share (MS) -.157 .511 
Operating Costs (OC) .166 -.753 
Marginal Physical Contribution (MFC). 861 * 316
Redundancy Indices (RED)
Proportion of Variation Explained ,223 .172
Cumulative Proportion .223 .395
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multiple regressions of the "x" set upon each variable of the "y" set
(Stewart and Love, p. 162). The relationship between the two sets of
original variables is captured by multiplying the proportion of the
total variation of the original "x” variables that is extracted by the X
2set times the squared correlation between X and Y (P ). The 
magnitude of the redundancy index, given a high canonical correlation 
coefficient, will,,therefore, depend upon the extent to which all of 
the variables in the "x" set are correlated with the X canonical variate. 
The sum of the redundancy indices for all of the significant canonical 
correlations gives the total or cumulative variation in the "y" set 
accounted for the by "x" set.
The redundancy indices of .223 and .172 for the first two canonical 
correlations, CC^ and which have a cumulative sum of .395, are
also reported in Table 2. The magnitudes of these redundancy indices 
indicate that for a cross-section analysis, a reasonable degree of explan­
atory power is provided by the empirical model. A review of the literature 
using canonical correlation analysis disclosed redundancy indices ranging 
from .15 to .59, comparable to the magnitudes obtained here. The fact 
that no additional redundancy was contributed by subsequent canonical 
correlations confirms the significance of the first two canonical 
correlations based on the F tests.
To interpret and evaluate the relationship between an individual 
explanatory variable and the set of dependent variables, the structure 
coefficients (S) (or "loadings", in the language of factor analysis) are 
used. (See Alpert and Peterson, Laessig and Dickett, Levine and Lambert 
and Derrand for an explanation of the development and use of the structure
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coefficient.) The structure coefficients are the simple correlation 
coefficients between each canonical variate and the original variable 
from which the variate is constructed, and are used more reliably than 
canonical weights for determining the degree to which an individual 
variable serves as a proxy for the entire canonical variate.
As seen in the matrix of structure coefficients reported in Table 2, 
in the first canonical correlation, CC^, MFC acts as a proxy for the 
explanatory canonical variate, indicated by a structure coefficient of 
861 The 22.3 percent explained variation (redundancy) of the first
2
canonical correlation, then, is based primarily upon MPC’s contribution. 
However, because MPC and EUV are found to be highly collinear, which casts 
strong doubt upon the reliability of the signs in the structure vectors 
of CC^, removal of the influence of one of the collinear variables is 
crucial before checking for the conformity of signs given by the statis­
tical output with the directional relationships predicted by the economic 
model. Therefore, the second canonical correlation, CC2, in which the 
influence of MPC is drastically reduced, is used as the basis for further 
analysis of directional relationships between the quality factors and the 
explanatory variables. The vector of explanatory variable structure 
coefficients for CC^ illustrates that most of the "explanatory power1 of 
the MPC has been exhausted by the formation of CC^ (i.e. the structure 
coefficient for MPC in CC2 is low = .316). Moreover, variation in the
explanatory canonical variate is seen to most closely parallel variation 
3
in OC and EUV.
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The EUV and MS variables have positive signs. Higher end-use values 
mean higher impacts of substandard quality grain upon buyer profitability 
which is reflected in higher quality discounts. The larger the local 
market share, the greater is the ability to charge higher than average 
competitive discounts. The OC variable was constructed so as to represent 
the declining costs associated with larger operations. A lower 0€ repre­
sents a larger scale of operation that rtiakes for a lower operating cost 
structure, particularly with respect to drying and milling processes. In 
a competitive market, these lower costs are expected to be passed along 
to sellers in the form of lower discount schedules. A negative sign on 
the structure coefficient for OC, however, implies that larger, lower cost 
firms, ceteris paribus, discount more heavily.
Traditional institutional arrangements may make large firms more 
likely to discount up to what they believe the market will bear. Farmer 
relationships with smaller operations tend to be more personalized and 
operate less strictly on an economic basis, and smaller firms depend for the 
most part upon local farmers for grain supplies. Many of the larger firms, 
however, extend their buying reach across a number of producing and buying 
areas. If, as is often the case, farmers face limited local buying 
capacities as well as the inability to economically truck their grain 
outside of the local buying area, a small firm-large firm dual discounting 
system can likely flourish. This interpretation is strengthened by the 
positive sign of the market share variable (MS) , indicating that the 
greater the market share of a single firm, the higher the grain quality 
discounts offered by that firm.
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Relevance of Standardized Quality Factors
The preceding redundancy analysis indicates the degree to which 
variation in the set of discount schedules is accounted for by the set of 
explanatory variables. The more important question, the extent to which 
each of the standardized quality factors being discounted is based upon 
economically important elements and is contributing to pricing efficiency, 
can be approached only by examination of the structure matrix for the 
dependent variable set. Again, from Table 2, the high structure coefficients 
for foreign matter (for CC^» S = .907) and damaged kernels (for CC2 » S = .952) 
suggest that discounts for these quality factors most closely conform to 
behavior predicted by the model of input characteristic pricing efficiency.
In other words, discount schedules for foreign matter and damaged kernels 
most closely represent what is being explained (to the extent of 39.5 
percent cumulative redundancy) by the explanatory variable set. Thus, 
those standardized factors do promote more efficient quality pricing in 
the market.
On the other hand, relatively low structure coefficients in both
canonical correlationsifor moisture and testweight apparently indicate
that variation in moisture, and to a greater extent, in testweight discounts
are not readily explained by elements important for pricing efficiency
4given by the theoretical model. In order to account for any structural 
difference in the discounting of corn and wheat, a separate canonical 
analysis was performed upon individual grain samples. With the single 
grain samples, a greater proportion of moisture discount variation was 
explained; for example, the structure coefficient for moisture in the
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wheat-only sample increased from ,450 to .645. Testweight, however, 
remained virtually unexplained by economically relevant factors, indicating 
that the testweight quality factor is not valued, or discounted, according 
to pricing efficiency or market structure considerations.
The finding that testweight is not an economically relevant grading 
factor is supported by the research of Hill (1973), Hill and Roush, and 
Hill and Jensen, in which no significant relationship between testweight 
and nutritional feed value of corn was found. Thus their findings also 
indicate' that, at least for feed use, bushel testweight is not a relevant 
factor for quality discounting of corn.
Conclusions
Empirical market evaluations of the accuracy with which prices 
reflect quality valuations are rare, partly because of the difficulty in 
determining exactly what "quality" is. The system of grain grades and 
standards provides an opportunity for such empirical testing because the 
quality factors upon which valuations, or prices, are to be based, have 
been defined. However, there is a question as to how economically 
meaningful these factors are to present-day grain purchasers.
A methodology for evaluating the economic relevancy of the quality 
factors has been developed here and applied to the price discounts made 
for grain quality in the Northeast market of the United States, using the 
technique of canonical correlation. Several conclusions may be drawn and 
some market prescriptions made based on the findings from this study.
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The model's results indicate that damage and foreign matter are, 
in fact, economically important quality factors that warrant discount 
pricing. The finding of this study that testweight is not, however, 
an economically significant factor for quality discounts, in conjunction 
with similar findings by other researchers, suggest that testweight 
should be considered for elimination from the United States government's
set of grain grades and standards.
The model did not explain moisture discounts very well. The lack 
of variation in moisture discounts within local markets may be related to 
the year-to-year variability in the degree of dryer utilization in the 
Northeast market. Annual fluctuations in harvest weather conditions lead 
to uncertain grain buyer expectations regarding the quantity of grain 
that the operation will actually discount and dry in a given marketing 
year. Because grain dryers use moisture discounts to pay for the long- 
run cost of dryer operation and ownership, a single year's discount 
schedule, usually set well in advance of the harvesting season, must 
account for both the level of the previous year's dryer utilization as 
well as the expected level for the coming year. If the net present value 
of the dryer investment is to be positive, compensation for two years of 
dry weather and low volumes of discounted grain, for example, would have 
to be accomplished bya significant increase in moisture discounts for the 
following year. Since weather patterns tend to vary across the local 
markets surveyed, relative similarity within and variability across local
markets in moisture discounts would not be unlikely. Ideally then, 
for further analysis of the economic relevance of moisture discounts, 
dryer utilization over time should be taken into account.
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This study’s findings that larger, supposedly lower-cost firms dis­
count more heavily than do smaller firms, and that the greater the market 
share of the grain buyer, the larger the discounts made, indicate that 
discount behavior is being affected by some non-competitive elements.
This suggests the need for some countervailing power on the part of 
farmers, as for example with the formation of cooperatives to create a 
more equal bargaining position in the determination of discounts applied 
to grain deliveries.
A more indirect corrective measure may be the provision of better 
market information to farmers by publicizing buyers’ discount schedules 
and providing assessment of the impacts of those schedules on farmer 
profitability, since farmers do not, at present, seem to be well informed 
as to buyers' discounts before bringing in their grain. With this infor­
mation, a farmer may be better able to decide among alternative buyers 
for his grain and/or consider investment in on-farm drying and storage 
facilities himself or in cooperation with his neighbors. While an 
accurate assessment of the extent to which these corrective measures are 
needed does depend on the particular local market under surveillance, at 
least in the Northeast market for corn and wheat, some improvements in 
the pricing efficiency of grain quality appear to be needed.
Footnotes
The theoretical model was developed on the basis of the simplifying 
assumption that the j quality characteristics present in a unit of 
input are independent of one another in terms of their respective 
effects upon output and quality characteristic pricing. To allow 
for the fact that the quality attributes are actually purchased as 
"bundles," the marginal productivity effects of quality characteris­
tic interaction must be included. This is done with canonical 
correlation, which represents the dependent variables of the 
theoretical model as an interdependent set of discounts.
This is so because canonical analysis is the equivalent of performing 
independent principal component analyses.on each of two sets of 
variables. Then the resulting component structures are rotated to 
develop weights for each variable that produce maximal correlations 
between components on each side. In the process, the correlations 
between certain members of the two sets are maximized, while the 
correlations between the other members are reduced nearly to zero. 
(Bharadwaj and Wilkening, p. 162).
The depletion of MFC's explanatory power for CC2 is confirmed by a 
canonical analysis of a model lacking only the MPC variable. In 
that model only one significant canonical correlation was found and 
it was virtually identical to CC2  for the full model in terms of 
structure and redundancy output.
To eliminate any possible distortions arising from the mixing of 
drying and non-drying firms in the sample (since moisture discounts 
should reflect the cost of drying as well as shrinkage), canonical 
correlation was performed upon the sample of only those 39 buyers 
with drying facilities. Results were very similar to those 
reported in Table 2.
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